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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC Action

2453

Soviet Long-Range Attack Capabilities

- a. Discussed the conclusions of the current United States Intelligence Board estimate.
- b. Noted the President's instructions that a minimum number of copies of the estimate be distributed and that every feasible action be taken to keep the estimate from becoming public knowledge.
- c. Noted the President's request that a study be made of the effect on the conduct of Soviet foreign policy of the Soviet military posture summarized in the United States Intelligence Board estimate. The study will include military implications of the estimate for the United States.
  - (1) The study will be made by a special committee, chaired by the State Department representative and including representatives of the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House.
  - (2) The Board of National Estimates will prepare a paper for the use of the committee which will seek to relate the Soviet military decisions reflected in the estimate to anticipated Soviet courses of action with respect to specific problems -- for example, Berlin.
  - (3) The committee's report will be presented to the President by August 15, 1962.

July 10, 1962  
502nd NSC Meeting  
NSC Actions 2453-2454

NSC Control No. 90

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\*NSC Declassification/Release Instructions On File\*

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NSC Action

2454 Space Policy and Intelligence Requirements

- a. Discussed the report of the ad hoc committee on political and informational aspects of satellite reconnaissance policy, prepared in response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 156.
- b. Approved recommendations 1 through 17 of the report (see attachment).
- c. Approved recommendation 18, revised as follows:

"The US should not, in presenting more detailed proposals for a separate group of measures to 'reduce the risks of war,' include advance notification of space launchings. If attempts are made by others to include space launchings with missile firings, the US should point out that (a) the trajectory of space vehicles can be distinguished from missile firings, so that space launchings would not be confused with missile firings, and (b) measures relating to disarmament of outer space, which we are proposing, include appropriate controls over space launchings."
- d. Referred recommendation 19 to the ad hoc committee for revision in light of the discussion.
- e. Noted the President's request that he receive promptly from the ad hoc committee specific recommendations as to the instructions to be given to Ambassador Dean covering his negotiations during the forthcoming disarmament talks in Geneva.

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